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We develop a model of interdependent preference types to capture situations where
an agent’s preferences depend on the characteristics and personalities of others. We deﬁne
a canonical type space and provide conditions under which an abstract type space is
a component of the canonical type space. As an application, we develop a model of
reciprocity in which agents reward the kindness of other agents.
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In many situations a person’s preferences depend on the characteristics and personal-
ities of those around him. This dependence may be due to the social inﬂuence that others
exert on the decision-maker or may stem from the fact that the decision-maker cares about
the consequences of his choices for those around him. For example, a person’s preference
over consumption goods may depend on how members of his peer group value these goods.
Alternatively, the individual’s inclination to charitable giving may depend on the person-
alities of the recipients of his charity. Hence, the preferences of an individual are a function
of his social environment.
We model the social environment in a simple way and assume that there is one in-
dividual other than the decision-maker. Hence, the description of the social environment
consists of the attributes of the decision-maker and of this other individual, where these
attributes (i.e., type) deﬁne how an individual responds to the attributes (type) of others.
The extension of our model to more than two agents is straightforward.
The diﬃculty in modeling situations of interdependent preferences comes from the
potential circularity of the formulation of types. Person 1’s type tells us how person 1
responds to the various types of person 2. Hence, to deﬁne person 1’s type we need person
2’s types to be well-deﬁned. Conversely, deﬁning person 2’s type requires a well-deﬁned
type space for person 1 and so on. A contribution of this paper is to ﬁnd a formulation
of interdependent types that is not circular and allows us to interpret those types in a
straightforward manner.
In our model, a type has two components, (f0,f). The parameter f0 captures all of
the relevant attributes of the individual that can be described without explicit reference
to his behavior. We call those attributes the agent’s “characteristics.” The personality of
the agent, i.e., how the individual responds to other types, is captured by f. For example,
if the agent’s inclination to charitable giving depends on the ethnicity of the other agent,
then the characteristic would be a description of a person’s ethnicity while the personality
would capture how an individual reacts to the other agent’s ethnicity and personality.
Our notion of a type avoids the circularity mentioned above by requiring that person-
ality be identiﬁed by a hierarchy of preference statements that gradually reveal the type.
1In round 1, the preference statement depends only on the characteristics of the opponent.
More precisely, round 1 speciﬁes a set of possible preference proﬁles as a function of the
characteristic of the other player. In round n>1, the preference statement depends on
the other player’s statements in the previous rounds. Hence, round n speciﬁes a set of
preference proﬁles for each possible statement of the other player in the previous rounds.
For example, consider a situation where the agents must choose between a generous
action G and a selﬁsh action S and all types have the same characteristic. Round 1 speciﬁes
the possible preference proﬁles of a type (for any opponent type). Let
θ1 = {(S,S),(G,G)},θ  
1 = {(S,S)}
be the possible round 1 statements. In this case, both players have the same preference
in each contingency. The statement θ 
1 implies the corresponding type always leads to the
selﬁsh proﬁle while θ1 implies that either proﬁle is possible. Note that round 1 identiﬁes
a unique preference proﬁle for the type corresponding to θ 
1. Hence, round 1 identiﬁes the
selﬁsh type.
Round 2 speciﬁes a preference proﬁle for every round 1 statement. For example,
suppose there are three distinct round 2 statements:
θ 
2 : θ 
1 →{ (S,S)};θ1 →{ (S,S)}
θ2 : θ 
1 →{ (S,S)};θ1 →{ (S,S),(G,G)}
θ
  
2 : θ 
1 →{ (S,S)};θ1 →{ (G,G)}
The statement θ 
2 is the round 2 statement of the selﬁsh type. The statement θ2 corresponds
to types who prefer the selﬁsh action when the opponent is the selﬁsh type but whose
preference remains undetermined otherwise. The statement θ
  
2 identiﬁes a type who leads
to the generous proﬁle unless the opponent is selﬁsh.
We require that the hierarchy of preference statements eventually lead to a unique
preference proﬁle for each contingency. The collection of interdependent preference models
that can be described in this way is our canonical type space. When the set of preferences
is ﬁnite there must exist a ﬁnite number of rounds after which any type can determine his
preference given any opponent type.
2Our main result relates the canonical type space to the following “reduced form” de-
scription of interdependent preferences. There is a compact type space T and a continuous
function Γ such that Γ(t,t ) is the preference proﬁle if type t faces type t . In addition,
there is a continuous function ω that describes the characteristic of each type. Our main
result (Theorem 2) identiﬁes a simple condition (validity) that is necessary and suﬃcient
for (T,Γ,ω) to be a component of the canonical type space. Validity can be interpreted as
a consistency requirement that ensures that types can be distinguished in a model where
players only know their own preference parameters (Theorem 3).
Our canonical type space provides a foundation for valid IPMs that is analogous to the
Mertens and Zamir (1985)/Brandenburger and Dekel (1993) foundations for informational
(Harsanyi) types. Mertens-Zamir and Brandenburger-Dekel deﬁne a type as an inﬁnite
hierarchy of beliefs over a set of possible parameters. Those parameters – or payoﬀ types
(Battigalli and Siniscalchi (2003)) – are by assumption exogenous and therefore require
no further explanation. The interdependence of Harsanyi types arises from the interaction
of the agents’ beliefs. Agent 1’s type inﬂuences agent 2’s payoﬀ because 1 has informa-
tion about a payoﬀ relevant parameter. Interdependence in our setting is not related to a
player’s information. A player’s personality speciﬁes how the player reacts to the charac-
teristics and personalities of other players and is independent of what the player knows. As
a result, the standard deﬁnition of a type cannot capture interdependent preference types.
Our construction of preference types and the Mertens-Zamir and Brandenburger-Dekel
construction of epistemic types are complementary. In a more general model, epistemic
types (i.e., the inﬁnite hierarchies of beliefs) can be deﬁned over interdependent preference
types (i.e., the set of parameters).1
As an application, we present a deﬁnition of reciprocity and identify a class of in-
terdependent preference models that is characterized by reciprocity. Experimental results
suggest that subjects reciprocate generous behavior even if reciprocating is not in the their
material self-interest. Camerer and Thaler (1995) survey results related to the ultima-
tum bargaining game. In that game, player 1 proposes a division of surplus and player
1 Alternatively, one could develop a model in which interdependent preference types and epistemic
types are constructed simultaneously. Such a model would allow for an interaction between preference
interdependence and belief interdependence. We leave it for future research to analyze such a model.
32 accepts or rejects. If player 2 rejects both players receive nothing. In experiments it is
routinely observed that subjects reject the proposed division even though rejection makes
them strictly worse oﬀ. One explanation of this and related experimental ﬁndings is that
subjects care about the payoﬀ of both players. Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) and Fehr and
Schmidt (1999) provide such models.
Experiments by Blount (1995) and Falk, Fehr, and Fishbacher (2000) (FFF) demon-
strate that subjects care not only about outcomes but also about the opponent’s intentions,
i.e., types. FFF consider a simple sequential game. In the ﬁrst stage, player 1 can make a
(positive or negative) transfer to player 2. Increasing player 2’s payoﬀ by two units costs
player 1 a unit of his own payoﬀ. In the second stage, player 2 can reward or punish player
1. To examine whether intentions aﬀect behavior, FFF consider two treatments of this
experiment. In the ﬁrst treatment, each subject is free to choose any strategy. In the sec-
ond treatment, a randomization device, calibrated to match the distribution of aggregate
play in the ﬁrst treatment, makes player 1’s choice for him. The key ﬁnding is that in the
second treatment subjects (in the role of player 2) are less inclined to punish or reward
their opponents than in the ﬁrst treatment. The interpretation is that play in the second
treatment does not reveal the opponent’s type and hence removes a motive for punishment
or reward.
Section 4, we develop a model of reciprocity. Let A =[ 0 ,1]×[0,1] denote the possible
outcomes. For (a1,a 2) ∈ A, the quantity a1 is the individual’s own reward and a2 is
the opponent’s reward. Assume that preferences are described by a single parameter r ∈
[a,a+d], where r is the weight the agent puts on the opponent’s payoﬀ and a<a+d ≤ 1.2
The preference r maximizes
ru(a2)+( 1− r)u(a1)
for some ﬁxed u. The parameter r depends on the player’s type and on his opponent’s
type. Higher r’s correspond to nicer preferences. Suppose a type is a numbers x ∈ [0,1].
The function γ speciﬁes the weight r that type x gives the payoﬀ of an opponent type y.
γ(x,y)=a + bx + cy + dxy (1)
2 Note that a may be negative. A preference r<0 is spiteful, i.e., the individual is willing to trade oﬀ
a reduction in his own reward for a reduction in the opponent’s reward.
4where 0 <b ,0 <c ,d+ c>0,b+ d>0. The number x measures the kindness of a type.
When x>ythen type x is nicer to z than y for all z, i.e., x is kinder than y.A t y p e
reciprocates if he is nicer to a kinder opponent. For the parameter values indicated above
all types reciprocate.
In experiments, when players are matched to play a game, they do not know their
opponent’s personality. Players must form beliefs about their opponent’s type and choose
their actions accordingly. Hence, a player’s action will reﬂect both his own type and his
beliefs regarding his opponent’s type. The reciprocity model above can be used to analyze
the FFF experiment. In treatment 1, player 1 chooses the transfer and therefore reveals
information about his type to player 2. A higher transfer will typically mean a higher
type x for player 1. Since all types are reciprocating, player 2 will put more weight on his
opponent’s payoﬀ if he believes that the opponent’s x is higher. Hence, player 2 will put
a higher weight on player 1’s utility if player 1 chooses a higher transfer. In contrast, the
transfer in treatment 2 reveals no information about player 1’s type and therefore player
2’s weight on his opponent’s utility is independent of the chosen transfer.
The formula (1) above, generalizes a related model by Levine (1998). Levine’s formu-
lation corresponds to the case where d = 0. Our Theorem 4 gives conditions on the type
space that identify formula (1) above.
1.1 Related Literature: Psychological Games
Our model maintains the separation of preferences and beliefs. This is in contrast to
the model proposed by Geanakoplos, Pearce and Stacchetti (1989) (GPS) where players
preferences may depend directly on the beliefs of players. In section 5, we provide a detailed
comparison of GPS and our model.
Based on GPS, several authors3 have proposed models of reciprocity. Rabin (1993)
develops a theory of fairness and reciprocity in normal form games. Dufwenberg and
Kirchsteiger (2005) propose such a theory for extensive form games. Segal and Sobel (2003)
assume that a player’s utility function is parameterized by the [player’s belief about the]
strategy proﬁle in the game. They provide axioms yielding a separable utility function
that incorporates the opponent’s welfare.
3 See Sobel (2004) for a survey. See also Charness and Rabin (2002), Cox and Friedman (2002), Falk
and Fischbacher (1998) for other models related to GPS.
5The models based on GPS require a strategic context to deﬁne reciprocity or other
personality traits. Each agent formulates beliefs about the opponents’ behavior and the
opponent’s beliefs. Those beliefs, in turn, trigger a desire to reward or punish opponents.
In our approach, the desire to punish or reward is triggered not by beliefs but by the
personality of the opponent. An agent’s personality is deﬁned independently of the strategic
context and is characterized by how this agent’s preferences change as he meets opponents
of diﬀerent types. For example, a kind person is someone who is nice to the opponent
irrespective of their type. An reciprocating agent is someone who is nicer to a kinder
opponent, etc. The advantage of our model is that types can be identiﬁed independently
of the particular strategic context.
2. Interdependent Types
In this section, we deﬁne interdependent preference models as consisting of an abstract
type space, a map that associates each pair of types with a preference proﬁle and a map
that associates each type with a characteristic. We provide an interpretation of a type as
a sequence of conditional preference statements and construct the corresponding canonical
type space. We show in Theorem 1 that each component of the canonical type space can
be interpreted as an interdependent preference model.
Let A denote the compact metric space of alternatives. A binary relation R on A is
transitive if xRy,yRz implies xRz for all x,y,z ∈ Z. The binary relation R is complete
if either xRy or yRx holds for all x,y ∈ Z.I fR is both transitive and complete, we say
that R is a preference relation. The binary relation R is continuous if for all x ∈ Z, the
sets {y ∈ Z |yRx},{y ∈ Z |xRy} are closed subsets of Z. Let R⊂A × A be a nonempty
and compact set of continuous preference relations on A.
When Xj is a metric spaces for all j in some countable or ﬁnite index set J, we endow
×j∈JXj with the sup metric. For any compact metric space X, we endow HX, the set of
all nonempty, closed subset of X with the Hausdorﬀ topology.
We assume that there are two players. Each player is described by a type that captures
all relevant information about the player. Each pair of types gives rise to a preference
proﬁle. In addition, types may be distinguished by a characteristic. A characteristic
6refers to those attributes that can be described or observed without reference to the type’s
behavior. For example, a characteristic could be a physical attribute, such as the ethnicity
or the height of a type. We refer to those aspects of a type that can only be described
through behavior as the type’s personality.
Let T denote the compact metric space of types and let Ω denote a compact metric
space of characteristics. The characteristic of a type is captured by function ω : T → Ω.
We assume that ω is continuous and onto.4 Let Γ : T × T →R×Rbe the function that
associates with each pair of types (t,t ) the corresponding pair of preferences (R,R ). We
assume that Γ is continuous and satisﬁes the following symmetry requirement
Γ(t,t )=( R,R ) implies Γ(t ,t)=( R ,R)( S)
The symmetry requirement (S) ensures that the preference proﬁle depends only on the
types of players (and not on their names). Condition (S) implies that we can express Γ as
Γ(t,t )=( γ(t,t ),γ(t ,t))
where γ : T →Ris a continuous function. We call M =( T,γ,ω)a ninterdependent
preference model (IPM). When all types have the same characteristic, we ignore ω and
write M =( T,γ) instead of M =( T,γ,ω).
Example 1: (Levels of Politeness) Two agents stand in front of an open door. Each
agent either prefers to go (ﬁrst) or to wait and let the other person go ﬁrst. We denote the
former preference with g and the latter preference with w. There is a ﬁnite set of types
T = {1,...,k} and types can be ordered by their politeness. Moreover, politeness begets
politeness, that is, all types are (weakly) more inclined to be polite if the opponent is a
more polite type. To capture this, assume that when type t faces opponent type t  he
prefers to wait if t+t  >kand he prefers to go when t+t  ≤ k. In this example, all types
have the same characteristic. The function γ is deﬁned as follows:
γ(t,t )=
 
w if t  + t>k
g if t  + t ≤ k
(2)
4 Note that the ontoness entails no loss of generality since we can re-deﬁne Ω as ω(T).
7To illustrate our interpretation of types, we oﬀer an alternative description of the γ in
equation (2) as a hierarchy of preference statements: In round 1 each type reports the set
of possible preference proﬁle. Hence, type 1 reports θ1
1 = {(g,g)}, types 2,...,k report
θ2
1 = {(g,g),(w,w)}. Note that round 1 identiﬁes types 1. In round 2 each type reports
the set of possible preference proﬁles for every possible round 1 statement of the opponent.
Let θ1




{(g,g)} if θ1 = θ1
1
{(g,g),(w,w)} if θ1 = θ2
1.
Let θ2




{(g,g)} if θ1 = θ1
1
{(w,w)} if θ1 = θ2
1.
Note that the round 2 statement identiﬁes type k. Similarly, in round 3 each agent speciﬁes
the set of possible preferences for each possible statement of the opponent in the previous
two rounds, i.e., for each pair (θ1,θ 2). Continuing in this fashion it is easy to see that
all types are identiﬁed after at most k − 1 rounds. Note that in this example, all types
have the same characteristic. In the general case where diﬀerent types have diﬀerent
characteristics, there would be a round 0 in the hierarchy of preference statements for
reporting characteristics. Then, an agent’s subsequent reports would also be a function of
his opponent’s announced characteristic.
Our construction of the canonical type space generalizes the example above. The
canonical type space depends on the set of alternatives A, the set of preferences R and a
compact space of characteristics Ω. For notational simplicity we suppress the dependence
of the canonical type space space on A,R,Ω.
Let X,Z be compact metric spaces. Recall that HZ denotes the set of all non-empty,
closed subsets of Z. We let C(X,HZ) denote the set of all functions f : X →H Z such
that G(f)={(x,z) ∈ X × Z |z ∈ f(x)} is closed in X × Z. We endow C(X,HZ) with
the following metric: d(f,g)=dH(G(f),G(g)) where dH is the Hausdorﬀ metric on the
set of all nonempty closed subsets of X × Z. We identify the function f : X → Z with
the function ¯ f : X →H Z such that ¯ f(x)={f(x)} for all x ∈ X. It is easy to verify that
8such a function f is an element of C(X,HZ) if and only if f is continuous. Hence, we use
C(X,Z) ⊂C (X,HZ) to denote the set of continuous functions from X to Z.
Let H = HS denote the collection of non-empty, closed subsets of the set of preference
proﬁles S = R×R . We begin by deﬁning a sequence of sets that represent a system of
interdependent preference hierarchies.
Deﬁnition: A collection of nonempty compact sets (Θ0,Θ1,...) is a system of interde-
pendent preference hierarchies if Θ0 =Ωand
Θn ⊂ Θn−1 ×C(Θn−1,H)
for all n ≥ 1.
The entry θ0 ∈ Θ0 speciﬁes a characteristic. The entry θ1 is a pair, θ1 =( f0,f 1) such
that f0 is a characteristic and f1 is an element of C(Θ0,H). Hence, the function f1 speciﬁes
for every characteristic a subset of preference proﬁles. More generally, θn =( f0,...,f n)
where f0 ∈ Θ0 and fk ∈C (Θk−1,H) for k =1 ,...,n. The function fk speciﬁes for each
θk−1 the set of possible preference proﬁles given the information that has been revealed by
round k.
The entries θn ∈ Θn must satisfy certain consistency requirements. To understand
the ﬁrst consistency requirement, consider any θn+1 =( f0,...,f n+1) ∈ Θn+1. The ﬁrst
requirement is that fn+1 should not contradict what was revealed by fn and that fn
should reveal whatever is already known by round n. The ﬁrst part of this statement
means that for any θ 
n =( θ 
n−1,f 
n)w em u s th a v efn+1(θ 
n) ⊂ fn(θ 
n−1), i.e., adding f 
n to
the opponent’s report θ 
n−1 must imply a smaller set of possible preferences for θn+1. The
second part requires that fn(θ 
n−1) not contain any preference that is sure to be removed in
the next round. Hence, consistency requires that fn(θ 
n−1) is the union of the sets fn+1(θ 
n)
taken over all the possible continuations θ 
n of θ 
n−1.
To understand the second consistency requirement, let θn =( θ 




n). The second part of consistency says that the round n statements of the two
individuals cannot be incompatible. That is, fn(θ 
n−1) must contain a preference proﬁle
(R,R ) such that (R ,R) is contained in f 
n(θn−1).
9Deﬁnition: The system of interdependent preference hierarchies (Θ0,Θ1,...) is consis-










n) for all θ 
n−1 ∈ Θn−1.
(ii) For all (θ 
n−1,f 
n) ∈ Θn there is (R,R ) ∈Ssuch that (R,R ) ∈ fn(θ 
n−1) and
(R ,R) ∈ f 
n(θn−1).
Note that a consistent system of interdependent preferences has the feature that for
every θn ∈ Θn there is fn+1 such that (θn,f n+1) ∈ Θn+1. Hence, every report θn has
a feasible continuation. To see this, take any (f 
0,...,f 
n,f 
n+1) ∈ Θn+1 and note that
f 
n(θn−1) must be non-empty; if {fn|(θn−1,f n) ∈ Θn} were empty then (i) would imply
that f 
n(θn−1) is empty.
Next, we deﬁne types and components of the canonical type space. For a given
consistent system of interdependent preference hierarchies (Θ0,Θ1,...), we deﬁne a type
to be a sequence (f0,f 1,...) with the property that (f0,...,f n) ∈ Θn. To qualify as a
component of the canonical type space, Θ must satisfy an additional property. Every type
must generate a unique preference when confronted with any other type in the component
Θ. This means that for every pair of types (f0,f 1,...),(f 
0,f 
1,...) it must be the case
that fn(f 
0,...,f 
n−1) converges to a singleton as n →∞ . To simplify the notation, let
θ(n)=( f0,f 1,...,f n) denote the n−truncation of the sequence θ =( f0,f 1,...).
Deﬁnition: Let (Θ0,Θ1,...) be a consistent sequence of interdependent preference hi-
erarchies. Let Θ: ={θ ∈ Θ0 ×
 ∞
n=1 C(Θn−1,H)| θ(n) ∈ Θn}. Then Θ is a component of
interdependent types if Θ is compact and for all θ =( f0,f 1,...) ∈ Θ
 
n≥0 fn+1(θ (n)) is a singleton
for all θ  ∈ Θ.
The canonical type space is the union of all the components of interdependent types.





10is the canonical interdependent preference type space or simply the canonical type space.
Note that each element θ ∈Fbelongs to a unique component Θ ∈I . Hence, I is a
decomposition (or partition) of F.
For any Θ ∈I , let Ψ : Θ × Θ →Sdenote the function that speciﬁes the preference




fn+1(θ (n)) for (f0,f 1,...)=θ
Requirement (ii) in the deﬁnition of consistency ensures that the function ψ satisﬁes the
following symmetry condition.
Ψ(θ,θ )=( R,R ) implies Ψ(θ ,θ)=( R ,R)( S)
If Ψ satisﬁes (S) we say that Ψ is symmetric. We deﬁne φ :Θ→ Ω ×C (Θ,S)t ob e
the function that speciﬁes for every type θ ∈ Θ the characteristic of the type θ and the
mapping θ uses to assign preferences proﬁle to opponent types. Hence,
φ(θ): =( f0,Ψ(θ,·))
Theorem 1 shows that Ψ is continuous and φ is a homeomorphism from Θ to φ(Θ).
Theorem 1: The function Ψ is continuous and symmetric and φ is a homeomorphism
from Θ to φ(Θ).
An immediate consequence of Theorem 1 is that any component Θ ∈Iis an interde-
pendent preference model as deﬁned in section 2. Note that for a symmetric Ψ there is a
ψ :Θ× Θ →Rsuch that
Ψ(θ,θ )=( ψ(θ,θ ),ψ(θ ,θ))
Corollary: Let Θ be a component of the canonical type space. Then MΘ =( Θ ,ψ,ω) is
an IPM.
Note that Θ is compact (by deﬁnition) and ψ is continuous by Theorem 1. Therefore,
it follows that MΘ is an IPM. Theorem 2 in section 4 provides a converse to the Corollary
11above. It characterizes all those IPM’s that correspond to some component of the canonical
type space.
3. Valid Models
Not every IPM represents a component of the canonical type space. To qualify as a
component of the canonical type space, types must be uniquely identiﬁed by the hierarchy
of preference statements described in the previous section. The following is an example of
an IPM that does not satisfy this property.
Example 2: (Fixed Point Types) As in Example 1, agents have preferences about who
goes ﬁrst through an open door. Type 1 prefers to go ﬁrst (g) if the opponent is type 1
and prefers to wait (w) if the opponent is type 2. Type 2 prefers g if the opponent is type
2 and w if the opponent is type 1. All types have the same characteristic. The following







We can construct the hierarchy of preference statements for this example as follows. In
round 1 both types report {(g,g),(w,w)}. Given that types are indistinguishable in round
1, higher order statements will simply repeat the ﬁrst order statement {(g,g),(w,w)}.
Hence, the interdependent preference hierarchy cannot distinguish between types 1 and 2.
Note that the IPM in Example 2 has a “ﬁxed point” ﬂavor: each type can be identiﬁed
from his responses to the opponent provided that the opponent’s type is already identiﬁed.
However, if there is no a priori distinction between types 1 and 2 then it is not possible to
explain the diﬀerence between the two types in terms of contingent preference statements.
While our model does not allow the IPM in example 2, it does permit the following
version of the example: Suppose in Example 2 there are two possible characteristics (for
example, “tall” and “short”). Suppose type 1 is tall whereas type 2 is short. Type 1
has the preference g if the opponent is tall and the preference w if the opponent is short.
12Type 2 has the preference w if the opponent is tall and g if the opponent is short. Now
types are non-circular fashion because they diﬀer in how they respond to a (self-evident)
characteristic.
Below, we introduce the notion of validity to rule out interdependent preference models
with circular types. Our main theorem (Theorem 2) shows that valid IPM’s correspond
to components of the canonical type space.
A decomposition (partition) D of T is a pairwise disjoint collection of subsets with
 
D∈D D = T. Let Dt denote the unique element of D that contains t. The decomposition
D is non-trivial if there is t ∈ T such that Dt  = {t}. Let M =( T,γ,ω) be an IPM and
recall that Γ(t,t )=( γ(t,t ),γ(t ,t)). We use the (standard) notation
Γ(t,D): ={Γ(t,t )|t  ∈ D}
Deﬁnition: The IPM M =( T,γ,ω) is valid if there does not exist a non-trivial decom-
position D of T such that
(i) t,t  ∈ D ∈Dimplies ω(t)=ω(t )
(ii) t  ∈ Dt ∈Dimplies Γ(t,D)=Γ ( t ,D) for all D ∈D .
Hence, if M is valid only if we cannot ﬁnd a non-trivial decomposition of the type
space such that types in each set are indistinguishable. It is easily checked that Example
1 is valid while Example 2 is not. For Example 2, the decomposition D = {{1,2}} satisﬁes
(i) and (ii) and hence Example 2 is not valid.
Our main theorem, Theorem 2 shows that any valid IPM corresponds to a component
Θ ∈I . Two IPM’s M =( T,γ,ω), M  =( T ,γ ,ω ) are isomorphic if there exists a
homeomorphism ι : T → T  such that ω(t)=ω (ι(t)) and γ(s,t)=γ (ι(s),ι(t)) for all
s,t ∈ T.
Theorem 2: An interdependent preference model M =( T,γ,ω) is valid if and only if it
is isomorphic to a component of the canonical type space.
Validity captures the idea that the process of reﬁning the set of possible types through
preference statements does not terminate at a non-trivial decomposition. Our next objec-
tive is to demonstrate that a model is valid if and only if types can be identiﬁed without
an a priori understanding of types.
13Consider an IPM where all types have the characteristic. Hence, we write M =( T,γ)
and ignore condition (i) in the deﬁnition of validity. Suppose that every type knows his
own personality but does not know the personality of the opponent and that players have
no a priori way to identify or refer to types. Under these circumstances, we can represent
a type’s epistemic state by a knowledge hierarchy. In our non-probabilistic setting, the
appropriate model to describe a type’s knowledge is a hierarchy of possibilities. Since each
type considers every opponent type possible, the preference proﬁle and opponent type
combinations that type t considers possible are ρ(t)={(Γ(t,t ),t   |t  ∈ T}. Then, we can
deﬁne the knowledge hierarchy of each type can be deﬁned as follows:
m1(t)={Γ(t,t )|t  ∈ T}
represents the set of preference proﬁles that type t considers possible. For n>1 inductively
deﬁne
mn(t)={(s,mn−1(t )|(s,t ) ∈ ρ(t)}
The sequence m(t): =( m1(t),m 2(t),...) represents the knowledge of the epistemic type t,
i.e., it represents a hierarchy of possibilities that captures what the agent knows, what he
knows the opponent knows, what he knows the opponent knows he knows, and so on.
We refer to the sequence m(t)a st h eepistemic representation of type t.I fm(t)=m(t )
for t  = t , then a diﬀerent label is given to types with the same epistemic representation.
Note that two types with the same epistemic representation behave in the same way and
therefore those types are indistinguishable. We say that an IPM has identiﬁable types if
each type t ∈ T has a distinct epistemic representation.
Deﬁnition: Let M =( T,γ) be an IPM and let T∞ = {m(t)|t ∈ T} be the corresponding
epistemic types. The IPM M has identiﬁable types iﬀ m : T → T∞ is one to one.
Theorem 3 says that validity and identiﬁability amount to the same restriction.
Theorem 3: The types of an IPM M are identiﬁed if and and only if M is valid.
Proof: See Appendix.
The deﬁnition of m(t) is taken from the recent paper by Mariotti, Meier and Piccione
(2004) (MMP) who provide Mertens-Zamir and Brandenburger-Dekel type foundations for
14possibility structures. In a possibility structure, a type t is identiﬁed with a set of param-
eter (for example, preference proﬁle) and opponent type pairs that t considers possible.
Formally, let S be any compact metric space. A possibility structure on S is a pair (T,ρ∗)
such that ρ∗ : T →H S×T is a continuous one-to-one mapping. It is easy to see that
IPMs can be viewed as a subclass of possibility structures. For M =( T,γ), let S = S,
ρ∗(t)={ρ(t)}, where ρ is as deﬁned above, and note that (T,ρ∗) is a possibility structure.
Theorem 3 shows that only valid IPM’s correspond to well-deﬁned possibility structures
in the sense that each type has a distinct hierarchical representation.5
In a general IPM (T,γ,ω), where diﬀerent types may have diﬀerent characteristics, an
agent’s epistemic type will consist of a pair (t,ω0): the t will denote his own type and ω0
will be his opponent’s (observable) characteristic. Then, the function m will map epistemic
types to their epistemic representations; that is, m : T × Ω → T∞. In this case, Theorem
3 will still hold provided we modify the deﬁnition an IPM with identiﬁable types to be
one where distinct t’s yield distinct functions m(t,·). Hence, validity is equivalent to the
requirement that distinct types must have distinct knowledge hierarchies in some state of
the world.
There are two diﬀerences between possibility structures and IPMs. The ﬁrst diﬀer-
ence is the interpretation. A possibility structure describes agents’ knowledge hierarchies
regarding some underlying parameters. In contrast, an interdependent preference model
describes an agent’s response to the characteristic and personality of his opponent. The
second diﬀerence is that in an IPM the types of the two agents uniquely determine the value
of the parameter. A possibility structure allows for but does not require this property.
5 MMP provide a universal possibility structure (Tu,ρ u) that contains every other possibility struc-
ture (T,ρ) in the sense that the hierarchical representation corresponding to (T,ρ) is a subset of Tu. The
universal possibility structure (Tu,ρ u) is identiﬁed (as deﬁned above). Moreover, each possibility struc-
ture can be mapped to an identiﬁed subset of the universal possibility structure. However, an arbitrary
possibility structure may not be identiﬁed.
154. Reciprocity
Reciprocity describes a personality that is nicer to kinder opponents. We analyze
reciprocity in a simple setting where every type has the same characteristic and preferences
can be described by a single real number r ∈R o. We assume that Ro is compact and
that higher values of r are nicer preferences. A simple empathy model (SEM) is an IPM
(T,γ) such that γ : T ×T →R o. Since all types have the same characteristic, we omit the
function ω.
Let M =( T,γ) be an SEM. If type t ∈ T responds to every opponent type with a
nicer preference than type t  ∈ T, we say that t is kinder than t . Formally, t is kinder
than t  if
γ(t,t  ) ≥ γ(t ,t   ) for all t   ∈ T
Let   denote the “kinder than” relationship and note that   is a transitive binary relation
on T.
Deﬁnition: (i) The SEM (T,γ) is complete if t is kinder than t  (t   t )o rt  is kinder
than t (t    t) for all t,t  ∈ T. (ii) The SEM (T,γ) is reciprocating if t   t  implies
γ(t  ,t) ≥ γ(t  ,t  ) for all t   ∈ T.
A reciprocity model is a reciprocating SEM in which types are described by a compact
set of reals and higher types represent strictly kinder types.
Deﬁnition: An SEM (K,γ) is a reciprocity model if K is a compact subset of the reals,
γ is non-decreasing in both arguments and γ(x,·)=γ(y,·) implies x = y.
In a reciprocity model (K,γ), each level of kindness is represented by exactly one
type. If x>ythen γ(x,·) ≥ γ(y,·) and γ(x,·)  = γ(y,·) and therefore x is strictly kinder
than y. Theorem 4 below establishes that an SEM is isomorphic to a reciprocity model if
and only of it is valid, complete, and reciprocating.
Theorem 4: The SEM (T,γ) is isomorphic to a reciprocity model if and only if it is
valid, complete, and reciprocating.
Proof: See Appendix.
16Since every IPM is isomorphic to itself, Theorem 4 also shows that every reciprocity
model is valid, complete, and reciprocating. To gain intuition for Theorem 4, note that
completeness together with standard utility representation arguments ensure that the
types’ kindness can be represented by a real-valued function. Then, reciprocity yields
that two equally kind types are treated the same way by all other types. Hence, Γ(t,·)=
(γ(t,·),γ(·,t)) = (γ(t ,·),γ(·,t  ) )=Γ ( t ,·) whenever t and t  are equally kind. Then, va-
lidity implies that two distinct types cannot be equally kind. Lemma 9 in the appendix
completes the argument by showing that reciprocity models are valid.
4.1 The Linear Reciprocity Model
The linear reciprocity model has [0,1] as its type space and γ of the form
γ(x,y)=a + bx + cy + dxy
with 0 ≤ b,0 ≤ c,0 ≤ d + b,0 ≤ d + c. Theorem 4.1 below demonstrates that the linear
reciprocity model obtains if the following convexity and linearity assumptions are satisﬁed.
Deﬁnition: The reciprocity model (K,γ) is convex if x,y ∈ K and λ ∈ [0,1] implies
there exists z ∈ K such that γ(z,·)=λγ(x,·)+(1−λ)γ(y,·). The reciprocity model (K,γ)
is linear if
γ(z,·)=λγ(x,·)+( 1− λ)γ(y,·) implies
γ(·,z)=λγ(·,x)+( 1− λ)γ(·,y)
Convexity means that if f and f  are possible personality types (i., there exist x,y ∈ K
such that f = γ(x,·) and f  = γ(y,·)) then so is λf +( 1− λ)f  for any λ ∈ (0,1). Note
that convexity of a reciprocity model does not refer to the convexity of the set K. Rather
it refers to the convexity of the set (of functions) {γ(x,·)|x ∈ K}. Without convexity, the
linearity assumption has no force. Linearity means that if type z behaves like a λ,(1 − λ)
convex combination of types x,y then the response of all other types to z is a λ,(1 − λ)
convex combination of their responses to x and y. We say that reciprocity model is (K,γ)
is nontrivial if K contains more than one element.
17Theorem 4.1: A nontrivial reciprocity model is isomorphic to a reciprocity model
([0,1],γ) such that
γ(x,y)=a + bx + cy + dxy
where b ≥ 0,c≥ 0,b+ d ≥ 0,c+ d ≥ 0 and (b,c,d)  =( 0 ,0,0) if and only if it is convex
and linear.
Proof: See Appendix.
It is easy to verify that ([0,1],γ) with γ of the form described in Theorem 4.1 is a
reciprocity model. We will refer to reciprocity models that satisfy convexity and linearity
as linear reciprocity models and identify them with the γ’s described in Theorem 4.1. The
model presented in Levine (1998) corresponds to the subclass of convex-linear reciprocity
models for which d =0 .
Linearity and convexity ensure that γ can be identiﬁed by four parameters: a,b,c,
and d, where γ(0,0) = a, γ(1,0) = a + b, γ(0,1) = a + c, and γ(1,1) = a + b + c + d.
The comparison of b and c determines whether it is more important to be kind or to face
a kinder opponent; if b is large relative to c, it means that all types respond strongly to
small increases in the kindness of their opponents, while if c large than b it means that
one type has to be signiﬁcantly kinder than another to be treated signiﬁcantly nicer by
opposing players. The parameter d reveals the complementarities between reciprocity and
kindness. If d>0 then kinder types reciprocate more than less kind types whereas for
d<0 kinder types reciprocate less.6
Application to Ultimatum Bargaining: Considers an ultimatum bargaining game
with players who have interdependent preferences. Let (c1,c 2) ∈ [0,1]2 be the outcome of
the bargaining game. Each r ∈R o corresponds to the preference  r such that (c1,c 2)  r
(c 
1,c  
2) if and only if
ru(c2)+( 1− r)u(c1) ≥ ru(c2)+( 1− r)u(c 
1)
6 This interpretation is appropriate provided that the real numbers identiﬁed with preferences can be
interpreted as cardinal quantities; that is, provided that r4 −r3 = r2 −r1 can be meaningfully interpreted
as “r4 is just as nicer than r3 as r2 is nicer than r1.” The same is needed for interpreting the linearity
assumption.
18where u(c)=c.87 for c ∈ [0,1]. Consider the linear reciprocity model M = ([0,1],γ) where
γ(x,y)=−1/2+x + 19/ 26y − 19/ 26xy
Note that for the speciﬁed parameters kinder types reciprocate less (d<0).
To address the experimental evidence on the ultimatum bargaining game, we assume
that players are uncertain about the opponent’s interdependent preference type. For sim-
plicity, we assume that the support of the player’s beliefs consists of two types x ∈{ 0,1},
the prior probability of type 1 is 3/4 and types are distributed independently.
The game is a standard ultimatum bargaining game with private information regarding
the other player’s type. Player 1 must choose c2 ∈ [0,1] and player 2 must either accept
of reject this oﬀer. If c2 is accepted, player 1 receives the material reward c1 =1− c2 and
player 2 receives c2.
This game has a unique equilibrium. A type 1 player 1 chooses c2 =1 /2 while type
0 player 1 chooses c2 ≈ 1/5. A type 1 player 2 accepts all oﬀers while a type 0 player 2
accepts 1/2 and rejects 1/5.
Now consider the following variation of the game. Player 1’s oﬀer is determined by a
roll of the dice (either 1/2o r1 /5). In that case, player 2 accepts both oﬀers irrespective
of his type.
This example captures three features of the experimental evidence (see Blount (1995)).
First, players choose oﬀers that are above c2 = 0. Second, some player 2 types reject oﬀers
even if they entail positive rewards for themselves. Third, player 2’s response changes
when the oﬀer comes from a randomization device. In particular, player 2 is less inclined
to reject an oﬀer from a randomization device than an oﬀer by player 1. In our model,
the reason for this is clear: if player 1 makes the oﬀer, then the low oﬀer enables player 2
to infer that player 1 is an unkind type. Hence, player 2 rejects a low oﬀer from player 1.
When the randomization device makes the oﬀer then player 2 cannot infer player 1’s type
from his oﬀer. As a result, player 2 does not reject any oﬀer.
Note that our model predicts that players who make generous oﬀers (type 1) are least
likely to reject proposals while types who make the least generous oﬀers (type 0) are most
likely to reject an oﬀer. This is a consequence of the assumption that the model is complete,
19i.e., that types can be ranked according to their kindness. If players who make generous
oﬀers are likely to reject oﬀers this suggests that types cannot be ranked according to their
kindness.7
4.2 The Binary Reciprocity Model
Next, we consider reciprocity models with two actions; the nicer action 1 and the mean
action 0. There are two preferences; the nice preference (1) strictly prefers the nice action
to the mean action, while the mean preference (0) corresponds to the opposite ranking.
Hence, Ro = {0,1}.
We say that a reciprocity model (K,γ) is binary if {γ(x,y)|x,y ∈ K} = Ro = {0,1}.
Note that this deﬁnition implies that a binary reciprocity model is nontrivial. Theorem




0i f k ≤ l
Theorem 4.2: A reciprocity model is isomorphic to ({1,...,k},γ) where
γ(i,j)=G(i + j,k + G(n,i)) (3)
for some k ∈{ 2,3,...},n∈{ 1,...,k+1 } if and only if it is binary.
Proof: See Appendix.
To gain intuition for Theorem 4.2, note that, by compactness, a binary reciprocity
model must have a ﬁnite number of types {1,...,k}. Assume, without loss of generality
higher types are kinder. Since there are only two preferences, each type is identiﬁed by
the set of types to whom he is not nice; hence, let Ki = {j ∈ K |γ(i,j)=0 }. Validity and
reciprocity ensure that i  = j implies Ki  = Kj. Reciprocity also ensures that Ki is either
empty or of the form {1,...,j} for some j. Hence, there are k types identiﬁed with one
of k + 1 sets of the form Ki = {{1,...,j i} where ji <j i+1 and ji = 0 is interpreted as
Ki = ∅. Let n be the smallest j ∈{ 1,...,k} such that Kj = {1,...,k−j} if such a type j
exists. Then, we must have Ki = {1,...,k−i} for all i ≥ j and Ki = {1,...,k+1−i} for
7 We thank Larry Samuelson for a related observation.
20i<j . If no such j exists, set n = k+1 and note that we must have Ki = {1,...,k+1−i}
for all i. Hence,
γ(i,j)=
 
1i f [ i + j>k+ 1 and i<n ]o r[ i + j>kand i ≥ n]
0 otherwise
This proves the theorem.
Note that Example 1 (levels of politeness) in the introduction corresponds to the class
of binary reciprocity models with n = 1. When n =1 ,G(n,i) = 0 for all i =1 ,...,k.
Hence, every type wants to be polite to the most polite type and the most polite type
wants to be polite to every type.
Example 3: (Leaders and Followers) The binary reciprocity model can also capture
situations where types diﬀer in how conﬁdent they are about their preferences. Suppose
the set Ro = {0,1} refers to the color of a shirt, say red (0) or green (1). For this
interpretation ‘nice’ is replaced with ‘prefers green’ and ‘mean’ is identiﬁed with prefers
‘red.’ In this context, reciprocity represents the social pressure to have preferences like the
other player. Let k =4 ,n = 3, and suppose type 1 always chooses the red shirt while type
4 always chooses the green shirt. Types 1 and 4 are conﬁdent types whose preferences are
unaﬀected by the social environment. Type 2 chooses the red shirt if the opponent is type
t ∈{ 1,2,3} but chooses the green shirt if the opponent is type 4. Type 3 chooses the green
shirt if the opponent is type t ∈{ 2,3,4} but chooses the red shirt if the opponent is type
1. Types 2 and 3 are insecure types whose preference is aﬀected by the peer group. Hence,
γ(i,j)=
 
1i f [ i + j>5 and i<3] or [i + j>4 and i ≥ 3]
0 otherwise
This formula corresponds to equation (3) for k = 4 and n =3 .
In the following example, we embed a binary reciprocity model into an overlapping
generations model. The example illustrates two features of reciprocity models. First, when
players discover that the fraction of generous agents has increased they respond with a fur-
ther increase in generosity. This pattern distinguishes reciprocity from altruism. As Rabin
(1998) points out, a model of altruism could not generate this pattern because increased
giving by others would reduce or leave unchanged the incentive for giving. Second, the
21preferences in our model depend on the underlying distribution of types and - as a result
- past behavior reveals relevant information about opponent’s personality and therefore
inﬂuences behavior in the current period. In belief-based models such as Geanakoplos,
Pearce and Stacchetti (1989) and Rabin (1993), preferences depend on play’s beliefs in the
current period and therefore, past behavior is often irrelevant.
Example 4: (Cycles of Generosity) Suppose there are two types, a generous type who
always takes the generous action (irrespective of the opponent type) and a selﬁsh type who
takes the generous action if the opponent is a generous type and the selﬁsh action if the
opponent is a selﬁsh type. To analyze a situation with uncertainty, we assume that the
selﬁsh type takes the generous action if and only if the probability that the opponent is
generous is greater than or equal to α ∈ (0,1).
Consider the following overlapping-generations game. Each period a continuum of
players are born and all players live for two periods. A player born in period t is matched
with a player born in period t − 1 and takes either the generous or the selﬁsh action.
Players observe the fraction of players who take the selﬁsh action in the previous period
but cannot observe individual actions.
We assume that the distribution of types evolves according to a symmetric Markov
process with two states. In state H each player is independently assigned the generous
type with probability h>1/2 and in state L each player is independently assigned the




π 1 − π
1 − π π
Table 2
We assume that π>1/2 and
πh+( 1− π)(1 − h) >α>1/2 (4)
Furthermore, we assume that the initial state (in period 0) is L. Players of generation 0
take no action. At the end of periods t =1 ,2,..., players observe the fraction of players
22who take each action. Players know the initial state but cannot observe the the state in
subsequent periods or the actions of individual players.
Generous types in this game always take the generous action. Selﬁsh types take the
generous action if they believe their opponent is a generous type with probability greater
than or equal to α. (We assume, for simplicity, that ties are broken in favor of the generous
action.) The Nash equilibrium of this game has the following structure:
Let λt be the fraction of players who take the generous action in period t.I fλt =1−h
then the selﬁsh types take the selﬁsh action in period t+1. Ifλt = h then the selﬁsh players
take the generous action in periods t +1 ,t+2 ,...t+ τ. Hence, after observing λt = h
all players take the generous action for the next τ consecutive periods and then the selﬁsh
type reverts back to the selﬁsh action in period t + τ + 1. Note that during the τ periods
where all players are taking the generous action, no new information is being revealed. Let
πk be the probability that the society is in state H, k periods after it was observed that h
fraction of the population took the generous action. Hence,
πk+1 = πkπ +( 1− πk)(1 − π) (5)
The ﬁrst order diﬀerence equation (5), together with the initial condition π1 = π yields
πk =1 /2+2 k−1(π − 1/2)k (6)
for k =1 ,.... Then τ satisﬁes
πτ · h +( 1− πτ) · (1 − h) ≥ α>π τ+1 · h +( 1− πτ+1) · (1 − h)
That is, τ is the largest integer k such that πkh +( 1− πk)(1 − h) ≥ α. Our parameter
restrictions together with equation (6) imply that τ is well-deﬁned.
In period 1, players know that the probability that the opponent is a generous type is
π(1 − h)+( 1− π)h. Equation (4) ensures that this probability is less than α. Hence, all
selﬁsh types take the selﬁsh action and all generous types take the generous action. If the
state in period 1 is H, then the fraction of players who take the generous action is h; if the
state is L then this fraction is 1−h. Hence, players in period 2 can infer the state and act
23accordingly. If the state was H then all players take the generous action. But if all players
take the generous action the state is not observable. In this case, selﬁsh players continue
to take the generous action for τ periods and then revert back to the selﬁsh action. For
a generic set of parameters values (i.e., πk  = α for all k =1 ,...) the outcome described
above is the unique equilibrium outcome.
Note that if the fraction of agents that choose the generous action increases from
1 − h to h, the the following period all agents take the generous action. Hence, ﬁnding
out that population is generous causes an increase in generosity. The higher level of
generosity persists for τ periods and then the population’s generousity is tested again.
Observed behavior is relevant because it sometimes reveals the personality distribution in
the population.
5. Relation to the Literature on Psychological Games
Geanakoplos, Pearce and Stacchetti (1989) (henceforth GPS) introduce psychological
games to capture phenomena related to interdependent preferences. To illustrate their
approach, we consider the “bravery game” described in GPS .
The Bravery Game as a Psychological Game: There are two players but only player 1
chooses an action.8 Player 2 has beliefs about the behavior of player 1 and these beliefs
aﬀect his payoﬀ. The payoﬀ of player 1 depends on his beliefs about the beliefs of player
2. The b∗ column of the bimatrix below describes payoﬀs to the two players conditional
on player 2 believing (and player 1 knowing that 2 believes) that player 1 will be bold,





3, 1 0, 0
2, 2 1, 4
Psychological Game
8 In the GPS treatment there is a collection of agents in the role of player 2. For simplicity, we assume
that there is only a single player 2.
24As GPS observe, this game has two pure strategy equilibria and one mixed equilibrium.
One pure strategy equilibrium is for player 1 to choose the bold action. Given that player
1 is choosing b, in equilibrium, player 2 assigns probability 1 to b, and hence b∗ is the
relevant column. Conditional on b∗, it is indeed optimal for player 2 to choose b. The
other pure strategy equilibrium is for player 1 to choose the timid action. Again, given
t∗, it is optimal for 1 to choose t. Finally, note that the only mixture between b∗ and
t∗ that makes player 1 indiﬀerent between b and t is the ﬁfty-ﬁfty mixture. Hence, the
only mix strategy equilibrium entails player 1 choosing t∗ with probability .5 and b∗ with
probability .5.
In a psychological game a player’s payoﬀ depends directly on the player’s beliefs. As
GPS (1989, pg. 61) put it, “a player’s payoﬀs depend not only on what everybody does but
also on what everybody thinks.” Of course, even in standard game theory, a player’s payoﬀ
depends on his beliefs since these beliefs are used to compute his expected utility. But it is
clear that GPS mean something more than this when they refer to the direct dependence of
payoﬀs on beliefs: “Hence, we argue in many cases the psychological payoﬀs associated with
a terminal node are endogenous, in the same sense as equilibrium strategies are.” Thus,
their view of expected utility theory is not one based on the revealed preferences over
lotteries but rather on taking expectations of psychological payoﬀs. Indeed, the utilities in
the matrix above are not observable payoﬀs but psychological payoﬀs that depend on the
player’s beliefs in that game.
The discussion in GPS reveals three distinct roles for beliefs in psychological games:
First, beliefs have the standard interpretation and describe a player’s predictions of the
opponent’s play (or of the opponent’s beliefs in the case of higher order beliefs). Second,
beliefs play a role similar to that played by types in our model. Note that in the game above,
both player 1 and player 2 have diﬀerent preferences over player 2’s actions depending on
player 2’s beliefs (or player 1 beliefs about player 2’s beliefs).9 Finally, the dependence on
9 GPS often use beliefs as proxies for more permanent personality attributes. They describe the motives
of player 1 in the bravery game as follows: “His payoﬀ depends not only what he does but also on what
he thinks his friends think of his character (that is, on what he thinks they think he will do).” It is easy
to see that player 1 might be happier if he thinks that his friends believe that he will do the right thing;
why player 1 would be less inclined to do the right thing otherwise is much less clear. This problem does
not arise if we model player 1’s character with personality types; one that cares about what others think,
and one that does not.
25beliefs may be a shortcut for describing the payoﬀ consequences of the opponent’s response.
For example, player 1 may be concerned about an unfavorable response by player 2 if he
does not meet player 2’s expectations. In a standard game, this would be captured by
allowing player 2 to choose a punishment or a reward after player 1 has made his choice.
In the GPS interpretation, player 1 may internalize the potential punishment even if player
2 has no opportunity to carry out the punishment and even if player 1 never gets to verify
his assessment of player 2’s beliefs.
Next, we show that the model of interdependent types can capture the phenomena
that psychological games try to address. We illustrate two interpretations of the bravery
game with interdependent types. In the ﬁrst interpretation player 2 cares about player 1’s
action and player 1 may care about player 2’s welfare. In the second interpretation, player
2 cares about the type of player 1 and player 1 tries to signal his type.
The Bravery Game with Interdependent Types I: Player 1 must choose between a timid (t)
and a bold (b) action. Player 2 prefers player 1 to be bold. Player 1 is either an “altruistic”
type (a), or a “selﬁsh” type (s). The altruistic type prefers b over t in order to make player




3, 1 0, 0
2, 2 1, 4
Game with interdependent preferences
Assume that the prior probability of player 2 being type a is α and the prior probability of
player 2 being type s is 1−α. Then, if player 1 does not wish to disappoint player 2 (which
happens with probability α) he chooses b otherwise he chooses t. Note that “disappoint”
here does not mean “act contrary to prediction” but rather “make unhappy.” Hence, by
choosing the appropriate distribution of types we can replicate any of the equilibrium
outcomes of the psychological game above.
The Bravery Game with Interdependent Preferences II: Player 1 must choose between
a timid and a bold action. Observing player 1’s action, 2 chooses a reward (r)o ra
punishment (p). Player 1 may be strong or weak. The probability of a weak type is 1
3.F o r
26the weak type, choosing the timid action is a dominant strategy. Therefore, we will ignore















It is easy to verify that there are three equilibrium outcomes. One equilibrium is for the
strong type of player 1 to choose b and for player 2 to choose r if and only if 1 chooses
b. There is also a class of equilibria (all leading to the same outcome) where the strong
type chooses t and player 2 chooses r whenever player 1 chooses t. Finally, there is an
equilibrium where the strong type mixes 50-50; player 2 rewards player 1 if player 1 chooses
bold and mixes 50-50 if 1 chooses timid. Note that as in GPS – given the set of equilibrium
responses for player2–i ti sindeed the case that a strong type of player 1 wants to be
bold if player 2 expects him to be bold and wants to be timid if he is expected to be timid.
Like the GPS model, our model enlarges the set of payoﬀ relevant parameters. Payoﬀs
in our model depend on “what kind of person” the opponent is as well as the proﬁle
of actions. We introduce interdependent preference types to capture the eﬀect of the
opponent’s personality. Note, however, that a player’s interdependent preference type
can be identiﬁed independently of the particular game. The types in our model can be
inferred from a player’s behavior in other contexts. As we have argued in section 3,
valid interdependent types can be identiﬁed from observations much like the parameters
describing an agent’s risk aversion. In contrast, the payoﬀ functions in GPS are game
27speciﬁc and depend on an unobservable parameter – the player’s beliefs in a particular play
of that game.
6. Appendix
Let Z be a compact metric space. For any sequence An ∈H Z, let
limAn = {z ∈ Z |z = limzn for some sequence zn such that zn ∈ An for all n}
limAn = {z ∈ Z |z = limznj for some sequence znj such that znj ∈ Anj for all j}
Let X be a metric space and p : X →H Z. We say that p is Hausdorﬀ continuous if it is a
continuous mapping from the metric space X to the metric space HZ. Note that if p is a
Hausdorﬀ continuous mapping from X to HZ then p ∈C (X,HZ). However, the converse
is not true.
Lemma 1: Let X,Y,Y  ,Z be nonempty compact metric spaces, q ∈C (X × Y,Z), p ∈
C(Y  ,HY ), and r ∈C (Y  ,Y). Then, (i) An ∈H Z converges to A (in the Hausdorﬀ
topology) if and only if limAn = limAn = A. (ii) xn ∈ X converges to x implies q(xn,B)
converges to q(x,B) for all B ∈H Y . (iii) If q∗(x,y )=q(x,p(y )) for all x ∈ X,y  ∈ Y  
then q∗ ∈C (X × Y  ,HZ). (iv) If r is onto, then r−1 ∈C (Y,HY  ).
Proof: Part (i) is a standard result. See Brown and Pearcy (1995).
(ii) Suppose xn ∈ X converges to x. Let znj ∈ q(xnj,B) such that limznj = z. Hence,
znj = q(xnj,y nj) for some ynj ∈ B. Since B is compact, we can without loss of generality
assume ynj converges to some y ∈ B. Hence, the continuity of q ensures z = q(x,y)
and therefore z ∈ q(x,B) proving that limq(xn,B) ⊂ q(x,B). If z ∈ q(x,B), then there
exists y ∈ B such that z = q(x,y). Since q is continuous, we have z = limq(xn,y).
Hence, q(x,B) ⊂ limq(xn,B). Since, limq(xn,B) ⊂ limq(xn,B) ⊂ q(x,B), we conclude
limq(xn,B)=q(xn,B)=limq(xn,B) as desired.
(iii) Suppose (xn,y 
n) converges to (x,y) and zn ∈ q∗(xn,y 
n) converges to z. Pick
yn ∈ p(y 
n) such that q(xn,y n)=zn. Since Y is compact, we can assume that yn converges
to some y. Since p ∈C (Y  ,HY ), we conclude that y ∈ p(y ) and since q is continuous,
q(x,y)=z. Therefore, z ∈ q∗(x,y ), proving that q∗ ∈C (X × Y,HZ).
28(iv) The continuity and ontoness of r ensures that r−1 maps Y into hY  . Assume that
yn converges to y, y 
n ∈ r−1(yn) and y 
n converges to y . Then, r(y 
n)=yn for all n and by
continuity r(y )=y. Therefore, y  ∈ r−1(y) as desired.
Lemma 2: Let X and Z be compact metric spaces. Suppose pn ∈C (X,HZ) and
pn(x) ⊂ pn+1(x) for all n ≥ 1, x ∈ X. Let p(x): =
 
n≥1 pn(x) and assume p(x) is a
singleton for all x ∈ X. Then, (i) p is continuous and (ii) pn converges to p.
Proof: Obviously,
 
n≥1 G(pn)=G(p). Since pn ∈C (X,HZ) and X,Z are compact, so is
G(pn). Therefore G(p) is compact (and therefore closed) as well. Since p is a function and
both X,Z are compact, the fact that p has a closed graph implies that p is continuous.
To prove (ii), it is enough to show that if Gn is a sequence of compact sets such
that Gn+1 ⊂ Gn then Gn converges (in the Hausdorﬀ topology) to G :=
 
n Gn. If not,
since G1 is compact, we could ﬁnd  >0 and yn ∈ Gn converging to some y ∈ G1 such
that d(yn,G) > for all n. Hence, d(y,G) ≥   and therefore there exists K such that
y/ ∈ GK for all n ≥ K. Choose    > 0 such that miny ∈GK d(y ,y) ≥    and K  such that
n ≥ K  implies d(yn,y) <   /2. Then, for n ≥ max{K,K } we have d(yn,y) ≥    and
d(yn,y) <   /2, a contradiction.
We say that pn ∈C (X,HZ) converges to p ∈C (X,HZ) uniformly if for all  >0, there
exists N such that n ≥ N implies d(pn(x),p(x)) <  .
Let X be an arbitrary set and Z be a compact metric space. Given any two functions
p,q that map X into HZ, let d∗(p,q) = supx∈X d(p(x),q(x)) where d is the Hausdorﬀ
metric on HZ.
Lemma 3: (i) If pn ∈C (X,HZ) converges to p ∈C (X,Z), then pn converges to p
uniformly; that is, limn d∗(pn,p)=0 . (ii) The relative topology of C(X,Z) ⊂C (X,HZ) is
the topology of uniform convergence.
Proof: Let limpn = p ∈C (X,Z). Then, p is continuous and since X is compact, it is
uniformly continuous. For  >0 choose a strictly positive    < such that d(x,x ) <   
implies d(p(x),p(x )) <  . Then, choose N so that dH(G(p),G(pn)) <    for all n ≥ N.
29Hence, for n ≥ N, x ∈ X and z ∈ pn(x), we have x  ∈ X such that d(x,x ) <    and
d(p(x ),z) <   . Hence, d(p(x),z) ≤ d(p(x ),z)+d(p(x ),p(x)) < 2  as desired.
Next, we will show that pn converges to p uniformly implies G(pn) converges to G(p)
in the Hausdorﬀ metric. This, together with (i) will imply (ii). Consider any sequence pn
converging uniformly to p. Choose N such that n ≥ N implies d(pn(x),p(x)) ≤  . Hence,
for n ≥ N,( x,z) ∈ G(pn) implies d((x,z),(x,p(x)) <  , proving limG(pn) ⊂ G(p) ⊂
limG(pn).
For θn ∈ Θn and n ≥ 0, let
Θ(θn)={θ  ∈ Θ|θ (n)=θn}
Lemma 4: Let ˆ θ ∈ Θ ∈Iwith ˆ θ =( f0,f 1,...) and φ(ˆ θ)=( f0,f). Then, for all n ≥ 1
and θn−1 ∈ Θn−1,
 
θ∈Θ(θn−1) f(θ)=fn(θn−1).
Proof: Let P ∈ fn(θn−1). Since the sequence {Θn} is consistent, we may choose θn ∈
Θn(θn−1) so that P ∈ fn+1(θn). Repeat the argument for every k>nto obtain





θ∈Θ(θn−1) f(θ) ⊂ fn(θn−1) follows from the deﬁnition of f and the fact
that fn+1(θ) ⊂ fn(θ) for all n and all θ ∈ Θ.
Lemma 5: Let X,Y be compact metric spaces and Z be an arbitrary metric space. Let
q : X × Y → Z and let the mapping p from X to the set of functions from Y to Z be
deﬁned as p(x)(y): =q(x,y). Then, q ∈C (X × Y,Z) if and only if p ∈C (X,C(Y,Z)).
Proof: Assume q is continuous. Since X × Y is compact, q must be uniformly contin-
uous. Hence, for all  >0 there exists    > 0 such that d((x,y),(x ,y )) <    implies
d(q(x,y),q(x ,y )) <  . In particular, d(x,x ) <    implies d(q(x,y),q(x ,y)) < for all
y ∈ Y . Hence, d(x,x ) <    implies d(p(x),p(x )) <  , establishing the continuity of p.
Next, assume that p is continuous and let  >0. To prove that q is continuous, assume
(xk,yk) ∈ X × Y converges to some (x,y) ∈ X × Y . The continuity of p ensures that for
some K ∈ I N, k ≥ K implies d(p(xk),p(x)) ≤  . Since p(x) is continuous, we can choose
K so that d(p(x)(yk),p(x)(y)) < for all k ≥ K as well. Hence,
d(p(xk)(yk),p(x)(y)) ≤ d(p(xk)(yk),p(x)(yk)) + d(p(x)(yk),p(x)(y)) < 2 
30Lemma 6: Let X be compact and Z be an arbitrary metric space. Suppose p ∈C (X,Z)
is one-to-one. Then, p is a homeomorphism from X to p(X).
Proof: It is enough to show that p−1 : p(X) → X is continuous. Take any closed B ⊂ X.
Since X is compact, so is B. Then, (p−1)−1(B)=p(B) is compact (and therefore closed)
since the continuous image of a compact set is compact. Hence, the inverse image of any
closed set under p−1 is closed and therefore p−1 is continuous.
Lemma 7: Let X,Y be a compact metric spaces. For p ∈C (X,HY ), let ¯ d(p)=
maxx∈X maxy,z∈p(x) d(y,z). Then, (i) pn ∈C (X,HY ) converges to p ∈C (X,HY ) im-
plies limsup ¯ d(pn) ≤ ¯ d(p). (ii) p,q,p ,q  ∈C (X,HY ) and p(x) ⊂ p (x),q(x) ⊂ q (x) for all
x ∈ X implies d(p,q) ≤ max{d(p ,q )+¯ d(p ),d(p ,q )+¯ d(q ).
Proof: Since X×Y is compact (i) is equivalent to the following: pn ∈C (X,HY ) converges
to p ∈C (X,HY ), lim ¯ d(pn)=α implies α ≤ ¯ d(p). To prove this, choose xn ∈ X and
yn,z n ∈ pn(xn) such that d(yn,z n)=¯ pn. Without loss of generality, assume (xn,y n,z n)
converges to (x,y,z). Since pn converges to p, for all  >0, there exists N such that
for all n ≥ N, there exists (x 
n,y 
n) and (ˆ xn, ˆ zn) such that d((x 
n,y 
n),(xn,y n)) < and
d((ˆ xn, ˆ zn),(xn,z n)) <  . Hence, we can construct a subsequence nj such that x 
nj, ˆ xnj both
converge to x, y 
nj converges to y,ˆ znj converges to z, and y 
nj ∈ p(x 
nj), ˆ znj ∈ p(ˆ xnj) for all
nj. Since p ∈C (X,HY ) we conclude y,z ∈ p(x). But α = lim ¯ pn = limd(yn,z n)=d(y,z).
Hence, α ≤ ¯ d(p).
(ii) Let (x,z) ∈ G(p),(ˆ x, ˆ z) ∈ G(p ). Then,
d((x,z),(ˆ x, ˆ z)) ≤ min
(ˆ x,ˆ y)∈G(q )




d((x,z),(ˆ x, ˆ z)) ≤ d(p ,q )+¯ d(q )
and a symmetric argument shows that
min
(x,z)∈G(p)
d((x,z),(ˆ x, ˆ z)) ≤ d(p ,q )+¯ d(p )
31Therefore, d(p,q) ≤ max{d(p ,q )+¯ d(p ),d(p ,q )+¯ d(q )}.
6.1 Proof of Theorem 1:
We ﬁrst show that φ is continuous. Consider any sequence θk =( fk
0 ,fk
1 ,...) ∈ Θ
such that limθk = θ =( f0,f 1 ...) ∈ Θ. Let φ(θ)=( f0,f) and φ(θk)=( fk
0 ,fk) for all
k. Let θk =( fk
0 ,fk
1 ,...), θ =( f0,f 1,...) and  >0. By Lemma 2 fn converges to f and
therefore by Lemma 7(i) there exists N such that ¯ d(fN) <  . Since fk
N → fN Lemma 7(i)
implies that there exists K  such that for k ≥ K , ¯ d(fk
N) ≤ 2 . Finally, there is K   such
that d(fk
N,f N) ≤   for k>K   . Let K = max{K ,K  }. Lemma 7(ii) now implies that
d(fk
n,f n)) ≤ 3 , for all n ≥ N and k ≥ K. Therefore d(fk,f) ≤ 3  for all k ≥ K. This
shows that φ is continuous.
Next, we prove that φ is one-to-one. Pick any (f0,f 1,...),(g0,g 1,...) ∈ Θ. Let
(f0,f)=φ(f0,f 1,...) and (g0,g)=φ(g0,...). If f0  = g0, then clearly (f0,f)  =( g0,g).
Hence, assume f0 = g0. Then, there exists a smallest n ≥ 1 and θn−1 ∈ Θn−1 such that
gn(θn−1)  = fn(θn−1). By Lemma 4,
 
θ ∈Θ(θn−1) f(θ )  =
 
θ ∈Θ(θn−1) g(θ ) and hence f  = g
as desired.
Since φ is continuous and one-to-one and Θ is compact, it follows from Lemma 6 that
φ is a homeomorphism from Θ to φ(Θ). The continuity of Ψ follows from the compactness
of Θ and Lemma 5.
6.2 Proof of Theorem 2:
We say that D is strongly continuous if the function σ : X →Ddeﬁned by σ(x)=Dx
is an element of C(X,HX).
Let M =( T,γ,ω) be an IPM. Deﬁne the sequence of decompositions Dn on T as
follows:
Dt
0 = {t  ∈ T|ω(t )=ω(t)}
and D0 = {Dt
0|t ∈ T}.F o rn ≥ 1 we deﬁne inductively
Dt
n := {t  ∈ Dt
n−1|Γ(t ,D)=Γ ( t,D) for all D ∈D n−1}
and Dn = {Dt





 t ∈ T
 
and note that D is a decomposition of
T.
32Step 1: (i) Each Dn is continuous. (ii) M is valid if and only if D = {{t}|t ∈ T}.
Proof: (i) The proof is by induction. Assume that tk converges to t, ˆ tk ∈ D
tk
0 and ˆ tk
converges to ˆ t. Then, ω(ˆ t) = limω(ˆ tk) = limω(tk)=ω(t). Hence, ˆ t ∈ Dt
0, proving
the strong continuity of D0. Assume that Dn is satisﬁes strong continuity. Hence, every
D ∈D n is compact. Assume that tk converges to t, ˆ tk ∈ D
tk
n+1 and ˆ tk converges to
ˆ t. Hence, ˆ tk ∈ Dtk
n and by the strong continuity of Dn, we have ˆ t ∈ Dt
n. Pick any
D ∈D n and P ∈ Γ(ˆ t,D). By, Lemma 1(ii), we have Pn ∈ Γ(ˆ tn,D)=Γ ( tn,D) such that
limPn = P. Then, by Lemma 1(iii), we have P ∈ Γ(t,D), proving that Γ(ˆ t,D) ⊂ Γ(t,D).
A symmetric argument ensured that Γ(ˆ t,D)=Γ ( t,D), establishing that ˆ t ∈ Dt
n+1 and
proving the strong continuity of Dn+1. This concludes the proof of part (i).
If D  = {{t}|t ∈ T}, the D is a non-trivial partition with properties (i) and (ii) in the
deﬁnition of validity. Therefore, M is not valid. Suppose M is not valid and hence there
exists a continuous decomposition D∗ that challenges M. Then, D∗ is a reﬁnement of D;
that is, D∗
t ∈D ∗ and Dt ∈D t implies D∗
t ⊂ Dt. To see this note that since D∗ challenges
M it is a reﬁnement of D0. Moreover, if D∗ is a reﬁnement of Dk then D∗ is a reﬁnement








Γ(t ,D)=Γ ( t ,Dk)
Hence, D∗ is a reﬁnement of Dk for all k ≥ 0. Hence, D∗








 t ∈ T
 
= Dt ∈D
This concludes the proof of step 1.
Let Θ0 := Ω = ω(T). Deﬁne ft
0 := ω(t) and ι0(t): =ft
0 for all t ∈ T and deﬁne
inductively ft









Θ={(f0,f 1,...)|(f0,f 1,...,f n) ∈ Θn for all n ≥ 0}
ι(t)=( f0,f 1,...) such that (f0,f 1,...,f n)=ιn(t) for all n.
Henceforth, for any t ∈ T such that ι(t)=( f0,f 1,...) we write ft
n to denote the corre-
sponding fn. We also deﬁne the functions gt




Fact 1: For all n, the functions ιn are onto and continuous and the sets Θn are non-empty
and compact.
Proof: We will prove inductively that Θn are nonempty, compact, ιn is continuous and
onto for every n. Clearly, this statement is true for n = 0. Suppose it is true for n. Then,
by Lemma 1 parts (iii) and (iv), ιn+1 ∈C (Θn,H) and Θn+1 is compact. The functions ιn
is onto by deﬁnition.






Proof: Next, we show that ι : T → Θ is onto. Pick (f0,f 1,...) such that (f0,f 1,...,f n) ∈
Θn for all n. Then, for all n, there exists tn ∈ T such that ιn(tn)=( f0,f 1,...,f n). Take
tnj, a convergent subsequence of tn converging to some t ∈ T. For all n and nj >n ,
ιn(tnj)=( f0,f 1,...,f n). Hence, the continuity of ιn ensures that ιn(t)=( f0,f 1,...,f n)
for all n, establishing that ι(T)=Θ .
Next, we prove that ιn(t)=ιn(s) if and only if Dt
n = Ds
n. To see this, note that for
n = 0, the assertion is true by deﬁnition. Suppose, it is true for n. Then, if s ∈ Dt
n+1,w e
have s ∈ Dt
n and Γ(t,Dn)=Γ ( s,D) for all D ∈D n. Hence, ft
n+1 = fs
n+1 and therefore,





n. Therefore,by the inductive hypothesis, s ∈ Dt
n+1 ∈D n+1.
Part (iii) follows from part (ii) and the deﬁnitions of gt
n,ft
n.
Fact 3: If M is valid then (i) gt = limgt
n is well deﬁned and continuous and (ii)
d(gtn
n ,g) → 0 if tn → t as n →∞ .
34Proof: Part (i) follows from Lemma 2. For part (ii) ﬁx  >0 and note that by Lemmas
3(i), 7(i) there exists N such that d(gt,gt
N) < and ¯ d(gt




By Lemma 7(i) we can choose K so that ¯ d(g
tk
N) ≤ 2  for all n ≥ K. Therefore, by
Lemma 7(ii), d(gtn
n ,g n) < 3  for all n>max{K,N}. It follows that d(gtn
n ,g) < 4  for all
n>max{K,N} as desired.
Step 2: M is isomorphic to some Θ ∈Iif and only if D = {{t}|t ∈ T}.
Fact 2(ii) implies that Θn−1(θn−2)=ιn−1(Ds

















proving that {Θn} satisﬁes the consistency condition.






Assume that M is valid and hence D = {{t}|t ∈ T}. Since, ιn(t)=ιn(s) if and only if
Dt
n = Ds
n (Fact 2(ii)), we conclude that ι is one-to-one. For θ =( g0,g 1,...) we let θ(n)
be deﬁned as (g0,...,g n). By Fact 2, ft
n(θ(n − 1)) = gt
n(s)=Γ ( t,Ds
n) for theta = ι(s). It
follows that ft(θ)=Γ ( t,s) and therefore ft is a singleton.
To prove that ι is a homeomorphism we prove that ι is continuous and appeal to
Lemma 6. Consider tk converging to t. By Fact 3 it follows that for any two subsequences
of natural numbers n(j), k(j) both converging to ∞, g
tk(j)
n(j) converges to gt. Recall that d∗
is the sup metric. It follows from Lemma 3(i) that g
tk(j)
n(j) converges to gt in the sup metric
d∗ as well. Hence, for any  >0, there exits N such that k ≥ N, n ≥ N, d∗(gtk
n ,g) <  .
Since each ιn is continuous, we can choose K>Nlarge enough so that d(fk
n,f n) < for
all n ≤ N. Hence,
d(fk
n,f n) ≤ d∗(fk
n,f n)=d∗(gk
n,g n) ≤ d∗(gk
n,g)+d∗(g,gn) ≤ 2 







Hence Θ is isomorphic to M as desired.
Next we will show that if M is isomorphic to some Θ, then the function ι deﬁned
above is the isomorphism. Let ˆ ι : T → Θ be an isomorphism and ˆ ιn denote the n−the
coordinate function of ˆ ι. Recall that ι deﬁned above satisﬁes the property
ιn(t)=ιn(s) if and only if Dt
n = Ds
n (∗)
Note that this property uniquely identiﬁes the function ι. That is, if ˆ ι is any function that
also satisﬁes (∗), ˆ ι = ι. To see this note that if ˆ ι0 satisﬁes (∗) then obviously, ˆ ι0 = ω = ι0.
Then, a simple inductive step yields the desired conclusion. To see that ˆ ι satisﬁes (∗), note
that since it is a isomorphism, we have ω =ˆ ι0 and hence (∗) is satisﬁed for n = 0, Suppose
it is satisﬁed for n. Then, suppose ˆ ιn+1(t)=ˆ ιn+1. Since ˆ ι is an isomorphism, we conclude
ft
n+1 = fs





n+1. Then, Γ(t,Dn)=Γ ( s,Dn) for all Dn ∈D n. Since, ˆ ι is an isomorphism,
we conclude ψ(ˆ ι(t),ˆ ι(Dn)) = ψ(ˆ ι(t),ˆ ι(Dn)) for all Dn ∈D n. Which, by the inductive
hypothesis, yields ˆ ιn+1(t)=ˆ ιn+1(s).
Suppose s ∈ Dt
n ∈D n for all n. Since ι is an isomorphism, we have
ft
n(ι(Dn)) = ψ(ι(t),ι(Dn)) = Γ(t,Dn)=Γ ( s,Dn)=ψ(ι(s),ι(Dn)) = fs
n(ι(Dn))
for all n,Dn ∈D n.B y( ∗), we have ι(t)=ι(s). Since ι is one-to-one, we conclude s = t.
This concludes the proof of step 2.
Theorem 1 and Step 1 imply that any component of the canonical types space is a
valid IPM. Steps 1 and 2 imply that any valid IPM is isomorphic to a component of the
canonical type space.
6.3 Proof of Theorem 3
Lemma 8: The function mn is continuous for all n ≥ 1.
36The proof is by induction. For n = 1, continuity amounts to showing that if tn
converges to t then Γ(tn,T) converges to Γ(t,T) in the Hausdorﬀ topology. This follows
easily from Lemma 1(i) and the continuity of γ. To prove the inductive step, we will show
that if q : T → Y is continuous, then r : T →H (S×Y ) deﬁned by r(t)={(s,q(ˆ t))|(s,ˆ t) ∈
ρ(t)} is also continuous. By Lemma 1(i), we need to show that if tn converges to t then (i)
for any convergent sequence (sn,y n) ∈ r(tn), lim(sn,y n) ∈ r(t) and (ii) for all (s,y) ∈ r(t)
there exists a convergent sequence (snj,y nj) ∈ r(tnj) such that lim(snj,y nj) ∈ r(t).
To prove (i), let yn = q(ˆ tn) for all n. Since ˆ tn is in the compact set q(T), it has a
convergent subsequence. Without loss of generality, assume that this subsequence is the
sequence itself. Hence, lim(sn,y n) = (limsn,q(limˆ tn)). It follows from the continuity of ρ
that (limsn,limˆ tn) ∈ ρ(t) proving that (limsn,q(limˆ tn)) ∈ r(t).
To prove (ii), let (s,y) ∈ r(t). Hence, (s,q(ˆ t)) ∈ r(t) for some ˆ t ∈ T. Since ρ is
continuous, there exists a subsequence tnj and (snj,ˆ tnj) ∈ ρ(tnj) (hence, (snj,q(ˆ tnj)) ∈
r(tnj)) such that lim(snj,ˆ tnj) ∈ ρ(t). Since q is continuous q(limˆ tnj)=y. Therefore,
lim(snj,q(ˆ tnj)) ∈ r(t) completing the proof of (ii).
Let d be any decomposition of T such that for all t ∈ T,Γ ( t ,D)=Γ ( t,D) for all
D ∈ d and t  ∈ Dt. To prove that m is one-to-one implies M is valid, we will show that
m(t )=m(t) for all   ∈ Dt and all t ∈ T. Note that m1(t)=Γ ( t,T)=
 
D ∈d Γ(t,D )=
 
D ∈d Γ(t ,D )=Γ ( t ,T)=m1(t ) whenever t  ∈ Dt. Next, assume that mn(t)=mn(t )
for all t  ∈ Dt and t ∈ T. To complete the proof by induction, we will show that mn+1(t)=
mn+1(t ) for all t  ∈ Dt and t ∈ T. Suppose (s,mn(ˆ t)) ∈ ρ(t). That is, Γ(t,ˆ t)=s. Then,
there exists ¯ t ∈ D
ˆ t such that Γ(t ,¯ t)=s and hence (s,mn(¯ t)) ∈ ρ(t ). By the inductive
hypothesis, mn(¯ t)=mn(ˆ t) and therefore (s,mn(ˆ t)) ∈ ρ(t ) as desired.
To prove the converse, consider the decomposition d = {m−1(t∞)|t∞ ∈ T∞}.W e
will show that Γ(t ,D)=Γ ( t,D) for all D ∈ d and t  ∈ Dt. Suppose (s,ˆ t) ∈ ρ(t) and
m(t )=m(t). Then, for every n, there exists ¯ tn ∈ T such that mn(¯ tn)) = mn(ˆ t) and
(s,¯ tn) ∈ ρ(t). Since T is compact, we can assume without loss of generality that ¯ tn
converges to some ¯ t. Since Γ is continuous, (s,¯ t) ∈ ρ(t ). Since each mn is continuous
mn(¯ t) = limk≥n mn(¯ tk)=mn(ˆ t) for all n ≥ 1. Therefore, (s,¯ t) ∈ Γ(t ) and ¯ t ∈ D
ˆ t as
desired.
376.4 Proof of Theorem 4:
Lemma 9: Let K be any compact subset of the reals. Let γ : K × K → I R be
weakly increasing in both arguments and continuous. Assume that γ(x,·)=γ(z,·) im-
plies γ(·,x)=γ(·,z). Then, (K,γ) is a valid IPM if and only if for every x,z ∈ K,
γ(x,·)=γ(z,·) implies x = z.
Proof: Suppose all the assumptions of the lemma are satisﬁed and there exists x  = z
such that γ(x,y)=γ(z,y) for all y ∈ K. Then, deﬁne the decomposition D as follows: for
y/ ∈{ x,z}, Dy = {y} and Dx = Dz = {x,z}. It follows that γ(x,·)=γ(z,·) and therefore
γ(·,x)=γ(·,z) and hence Γ(w,D)=Γ ( w ,D) for all w ∈ K, w  ∈ Dw, and D ∈D . Hence,
(K,γ) is not valid.
Next, suppose that (K,γ) is not valid. Then, there exists a decomposition D of K
such that (i) there is D ∈Dwith x,z ∈ D such that x  = z, (ii) Γ(w,D)=Γ ( w ,D) for all
w ∈ K, w  ∈ Dw, and D ∈D .
Let ¯ D denote the closure of D ∈D . The continuity of Γ ensures that
Γ(w, ¯ D2)=Γ ( w , ¯ D2)( ∗)
for all w,w  ∈ ¯ D1 with D1 ∈Dand D2 ∈D . To see this, take w,w  ∈ ¯ D1 and y ∈ ¯ D2.B y
deﬁnition, there exists a sequence (wn,w 
n,y n) ∈ D1 × D1 × D2 converging to (w,w ,y).
Moreover, there exists y 
n ∈ D2 such that Γ(wn,y n)=Γ ( w 
n,y 
n) for all n. Since ¯ D2 is
compact, y 
n has a convergent subsequence that converges to some y  ∈ ¯ D2. Assume,
without loss of generality, that this subsequence is y 
n itself. Then, the continuity of Γ
ensures Γ(w,y)=Γ ( w ,y ) as desired.
The weak monotonicity of γ in both arguments together with (∗) implies
Γ(max ¯ D1,max ¯ D2) = Γ(min ¯ D1,max ¯ D2) = Γ(min ¯ D1,min ¯ D2)
Then, monotonicity of Γ ensures γ(w,y)=γ(w ,y) for all y ∈ K whenever w,w  ∈ ¯ D,i n
particular, for w = x and w  = z.
Lemma 9 establishes that every reciprocity model is valid. Clearly, every reciprocity
model is complete and reciprocating. Suppose that the SEM (T,γ) is isomorphic to some
38reciprocity model (K,γ ). Then, since (K,γ ) is valid, complete, and reciprocating, so is
(T,γ).
To prove the converse, suppose (T,γ) is a valid, complete, and reciprocating SEM.
Hence,  , the kinder than relation is a preference relation. The continuity of γ yields
the continuity of  . Since T is a compact metric space, it separable and hence there
exists a continuous real-valued function x : T → I R that represents  . Let K := x(T)=
{x(t)|t ∈ T}. Let Dt = {t  ∈ T |x(t )=x(t)} and D = {Dt |t ∈ T}. Clearly, D is a
decomposition of T such that γ(t ,·)=γ(t,·) for all t  ∈ Dt. It follows from reciprocity
that γ(·,t  )=γ(·,t) for all t  ∈ Dt, and therefore Γ(t,D)=Γ ( t ,D) for all t ∈ T, t  ∈ Dt
and D ∈ d. Hence, validity implies each Dt is a singleton and therefore x is one-to-one.
Then, the compactness of T ensures that K is compact and that x is a homeomorphism.
Deﬁne, γ(w,y)=γ(x−1(w),x −1(y)) for all w,y ∈ K. Since x and γ are continuous, so
is γ . It follows that (K,γ ) is a SEM and isomorphic to (T,γ). Since x represent   and
(T,γ) is reciprocating, γ  is weakly increasing in both arguments. Finally, Lemma 9 and
the fact that (T,γ) is valid imply that for every x,z ∈ K, γ(x,y)=γ(z,y) implies x = z,
proving that (K,γ ) is a reciprocity model.
6.5 Proofs of Theorems 4.1 and 4.2
Proof of Theorem 4.1:
Let (K,γ ) be a convex-linear reciprocity model. Let xλ ∈ K be such that
γ(xλ,·)=λγ(maxK,·)+( 1− λ)γ(minK,·)
By convexity, such an xλ exits for every λ ∈ [0,1]. Since (K,γ ) is a reciprocity model,
γ (x,·)=γ (z,·) implies γ (·,x)=γ (·,z), and therefore Γ (x,·)=Γ  (z,·). Then, validity
yields x = z. Hence, the mapping π : λ → xλ is one-to-one. The continuity of γ  ensures
that it is also continuous. Obviously, x1 = maxK and x0 = minK. Then, since [0,1] is
a connected set and π is a continuous function its image must be connected. Therefore,
π is onto. It follows that π :[ 0 ,1] → K is a homeomorphism. Let a = γ (π(0),π(0)),
39b+c+d = γ (π(1),π(1))−a, b = γ (π(1),π(0))−a, and c = γ (π(0),π(1))−a. We claim
that the IPM ([0,1],γ) where
γ(x,y)=a + bx + cy + dxy
is isomorphic to (K,γ ). By construction,
γ (π(1),π(1)) = a + b + c + d = γ(1,1)
γ (π(1),π(0)) = a + b = γ(1,0)
γ (π(0),π(1)) = a + c = γ(0,1)
γ (π(0),π(0)) = a = γ(0,0)
Then, by the deﬁnition of π,
γ (π(x),π(y)) = xγ (π(1),π(y) )+( 1− x)γ (π(0),π(y))
Since π is onto, linearity implies
γ (π(x),π(y)) = xyγ (π(1),π(1)) + x(1 − y)γ (π(1),π(0))
+( 1− x)yγ (π(0),π(1)) + (1 − x)(1 − y)γ (π(0),π(0)) = γ(x,y)
proving that π is an isomorphism form ([0,1],γ)t o( K,γ ).
To see that the conditions on the parameters b,c, and d are met, note
∂γ
∂x = b + dy
and
∂γ
∂y = c+dx. Reciprocity of (K,γ ) together with the fact that π is increasing ensures
that both of these partial derivatives are nonnegative for all values of x,y. The desired
restrictions follow.
Verifying that every reciprocity model of this form is a convex-linear reciprocity model
is straightforward and omitted.
Proof of Theorem 4.2:
Let (K,γ ) be a binary reciprocity model. Assume without loss of generality that
γ (x,y) ∈{ 0,1} for all x,y ∈ K and consider the mapping π : K →C (K,S) deﬁned
by π(x)(y)=Γ  (x,y)=( γ (x,y),γ (x,y)). Since Γ  is continuous, so is π. Hence, π(K)
is compact. Since S = {r1,r 2}×{ r1,r 2}, this means π(K) is ﬁnite. Validity ensures
40that π is one-to-one. Hence, K is ﬁnite and contains at least two elements. Then, set
K = {x1,...,x k}, where xi+1   xi for all i =1 ,...k− 1. Let Ki = {x1,...,x i} and
K0 = ∅. It follows from reciprocity that for each xi there exists some j =0 ,...,k such
that γ (xi,y)=0i fy ∈ Kj and γ (xi,y)=1i fy ∈ K\Kj. Let π(xi) denote this j.
Reciprocity implies that if π(xi)=π(xl) then γ (·,x i)=γ (·,x l), and hence Γ (xi,·)=
(γ (xi,·),γ (·,x i)) = (γ (xl,·),γ (·,x l)) = Γ (xl,·). Then, by validity, xi = xl. It follows
that the mapping π : K →{ 0,...,k} is one-to-one. Since K has k elements, there exists a
unique n ∈{ 0,...,k} such that n/ ∈ π(K). Note that for i>n , γ (xi,x j) = 1 if and only
if i + j>n , while for i ≤ k, γ (xi,x j) = 1 if and only if i + j>n+ 1. Hence,
γ (xi,x j)=G(i + j + G(i,n),k+1 )
where G(i,j)=1i fi>jand G(i,j) = 0 otherwise. Deﬁne γ : {1,...,k}→{ 0,1}
as follows: γ(i,j)=γ (xi,x j). Hence, ι(xi)=i deﬁnes an isomorphism from (K,γ )t o
({1,...,k},γ)
Verifying that every reciprocity model of this form is a binary reciprocity model is
straightforward and omitted..
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